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of Secularism: Questioning the Postcolonial
Genealogy
Todd H. Weir
Secularism has emerged as a central category of twenty-first century political thought
that in many ways has replaced the theory of secularization. According to postcolonial
scholars, neither the theory nor the practice of secularization was politically neutral.
They define secularism as the set of discourses, policies, and constitutional arrangements
whereby modern states and liberal elites have sought to unify nations and divide colonial
populations. This definition is quite different from the original meaning of secularism, as
an immanent scientific worldview linked to anticlericalism. Anthropologist Talal Asad
has connected nineteenth-century worldview secularism to twenty-first century political
secularism through a genealogical account that stresses continuities of liberal hegemony.
This essay challenges this account. It argues that liberal elites did not merely subsume
worldview secularism in their drive for state secularization. Using the tools of conceptual
history, the essay shows that one reason that “secularization” only achieved its contempo-
rary meaning in Germany after 1945 was that radical freethinkers and other anticlerical
secularists had previously resisted liberal hegemony. The essay concludes by offering an
agenda for research into the discontinuous history of these two types of secularism.
Keywords: Talal Asad, conceptual history, freethinkers, George Holyoake, postcolonial
studies, secularism, secularization theory
Shorn of its normativity and predictive confidence and circumscribed in its geographic scope,
the theory of secularization has nonetheless received important twenty-first-century restate-
ments. Philosopher Charles Taylor recounts the story of secularization as a disenchantment
c© Todd H. Weir. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The moral
rights of the name author(s) have been asserted.
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 7
not of religious beliefs, but of the framework in which they are situated. Despite the peri-
odic resurgence of religion in Europe and North America, its frame, he argues, has become
immanent. This means that believers and unbelievers alike share an awareness that faith is
no longer a given; it now involves choice. Historian Hugh McLeod has similarly argued
that the long-term transformation of religion in Europe is best described not as a collapse
of Christianity, but rather as a “decline of Christendom,” in which the churches successively
lost public and state power.1
While there is an emerging consensus that our current condition is marked by the
interlacing of religion and secularity, scholars disagree over the definition and the place of
secularism. In A Secular Age, Taylor defines secularism as the erroneous yet commonly held
notion that arguments against religion in the name of modern science were a principal force
producing secularity. Despite the fact that Taylor names exposing this fallacy as one of the
chief aims of his book, political scientist Wendy Brown summed up his thesis as “a history
of Christian secularism” and the first Library of Congress subject heading of A Secular
Age is “secularism.”2 This apparent mislabeling is not a sign of careless reading as much
as it is a sign of the powerful pull that the term “secularism” exerts in scholarship today.
Multiple critical projects can and do operate under its umbrella, giving the term a global and
interdisciplinary appeal. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that secularism is one
phoenix that has arisen from the ashes of modernization theory.
Much of the excitement surrounding secularism as a field of inquiry has come from
postcolonial studies, which has identified secularization not as a neutral social theory, but
rather as the scientific auxiliary of a technique of statecraft developed and deployed in
the nineteenth century to unify nations and divide colonial populations. By removing the
“ization” and adding “ism,” the new critical histories have signaled their effort to demystify
or, better yet, to secularize the theory of secularization by revealing that what was once
held for science was, in fact, ideology. Secularism, accordingly, encompasses the discourses,
policies, and constitutional arrangements, whereby modern states and elites have sought to
regulate religion and, in the process, contributed to the “immanent frame” in which religion
is now located.3
1Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hugh McLeod,
“Introduction,” in The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000, ed. Hugh McLeod
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–26.
2Taylor, A Secular Age, 4; Wendy Brown, “Introduction” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and
Free Speech, ed. Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Berkeley: Townsend
Center for the Humanities, University of California, 2009), 10.
3On the demystification of secularization, see Aamir R. Mufti, Enlightenment in the Colony: The
Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
The number of collected volumes on secularism continues to grow: Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism
and Its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Anuradha Needham and Rajeswari Rajan,
eds., The Crisis of Secularism in India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Craig Calhoun, Mark
Juergensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds., Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011); Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig J. Calhoun, eds., Varieties of Secu-
larism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Ranjan Ghosh, ed., Making
Sense of the Secular: Critical Perspectives from Europe to Asia (London: Routledge, 2013); Markus
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8 THE GERMANIC REVIEW  VOLUME 90, NUMBER 1 / 2015
In the course of writing a book on nineteenth-century German rationalist dissent,
Freethought, and atheism, I found the new literature on secularism extremely useful and
stimulating.4 But I soon realized that my informants could not be easily enclosed in the
history of secularism-cum-secularization told by postcolonial scholars. To begin with, I was
confronted by the fact that there are two definitions of secularism. The term was coined
in 1851 as a self-appellation by British freethinkers to clarify their essential aims. It tied
advocacy of immanent worldview and ethics to anticlerical critique. This contrasts with the
definition just outlined, which emerged in the early 1960s to describe the religious policies,
not of Western Europe and the United States, but rather of countries, specifically Turkey and
India, where separation was linked to modernizing ideologies of the state.5
If it were merely a problem of definition, one could separate these phenomena by
naming one worldview secularism and the other political or governmental secularism. How-
ever, their histories were intertwined. The liberal elites who backed secularization shared
with more plebian freethinkers assumptions about the cultural relevance of natural science,
the emancipation of religious minorities, and the need to limit church control of public ed-
ucation. At the same time, they were competitors, who clashed over political practices and
epistemological assumptions. The theorists of political secularism have tended to overlook
these clashes and subsume worldview secularism under the liberal project of secularization.
In the process, they have given their usage of the term “secularism” a pedigree that goes
back to 1851. In this essay, I question this genealogy by returning to the history of the strug-
gle for definitional control of the terms “secularization” and “secularism” fought between
freethinkers, liberals, and conservative Christians in Britain and Germany.
SECULARISMS: PLURAL AND SINGULAR
Awareness of the rival definitions brought me to what I see as the Archimedean point—and
key methodological dilemma—of the postcolonial literature on political secularism. On the
one hand, its authors eschew any teleological claims, and present themselves as advocates
of the subaltern, the fragmentary, the irreducible. On the other, they make constant recourse
to secularism in the singular and repeatedly employ a cast of hegemonic agents, who are
understood to be ultimately driving secularism, in terms of class: the bourgeoisie, in terms
of ideology: liberalism, in terms of institutions: the centralized, bureaucratic nation-state.
Scholars of secularism resolve the tension between the particular and the universal in
different ways. Social theorist Ashis Nandy argued in 1990 that the mounting religious con-
flicts in India revealed that political secularism was a colossus with feet of clay. Underneath
Dressler and Arvind-Pal Mandair, eds., Secularism and Religion-Making (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
4Todd Weir, Secularism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Rise of the Fourth Confes-
sion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
5A link between the two definitions of secularism is found in the incorporation of the French term
laı¨cite´ (laiklik) in the Turkish constitution of 1923. Laı¨cite´ fused the Republican cultural projects of
anticlericalism, positivism, and state secularization. It was enshrined in the French separation law of
1905, which became an international model for reformers.
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 9
a thin crust of Westernized state elites, who had inherited an antireligious orientation from
the colonial regime, most Indian politicians only paid lip service to Western norms, while
promoting more pluralist and more authentically Indian understandings of the public role
of religion.6 By and large, the critical scholarship has not taken Nandy’s lead and baldly
dismissed secularism as a false ideology designed in the West and ill-fitted for Indian society.
Instead, they have investigated secularism in practices and discourses produced at discrete
sites across the face of global modernity, where elites and governments faced the challenges
posed by religious communities to the emergent national and imperial states.7
In the pivotal text of the new literature, Formations of the Secular, anthropologist
Talal Asad proposes that scholars employ Michel Foucault’s genealogical method, whereby
major aspects of modernity, such as secularism, are traced back to earlier micropolitical
scenarios, from which they were liberated and made use of in other, larger arenas. He names
secularism an “embedded concept” of humble origins, which began in the “[l]ong-standing
habits of indifference, disbelief, or hostility among individuals towards Christian rituals and
authorities” but which became “entangled with projects of total social reconstruction by
means of legislation.”8 The invention of the term “secularism” in 1851 by George Holyoake,
the leader of British Freethought, serves Asad as a case in point. It marks the moment at
which the anticlericalism of marginal groups of subaltern radicals and Owenite socialists
was transformed and passed to the more powerful social forces of British liberalism. The
larger context for this shift, according to Asad, is the emergence of the modern nation-state
with its bureaucratic regimes of managing the population, which Foucault designated as
governmentality.
Thus, from multiple origins, secularism took on a more singular character as it became
a core doctrine of liberalism and practice of the state. Asad reintroduces the difference
between the universal and plural in his subsequent distinction between secularism, as a
“political and governmental doctrine that has its origin in nineteenth-century liberal society”
and “the secular” as a “concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and
sensibilities in modern life,” but for which there existed no “single line of filiation.”9
The challenge, according to the editors of a recent volume, is to place “plural sec-
ularisms” “in relation to the overarching narrative that gives them both political authority
6Ashis Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and Recovery of Religious Tolerance” in Veena Das,
ed., Mirrors of Violence (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 69–92. On the evolution of an “Indian
secularism,” see Rajeev Bhargava, The Promise of India’s Secular Democracy (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
7According to Gauri Viswanathan, the colonial context encouraged missionary educators in the 1840s
and 1850s to support secularist education as a means to wean Indians from their prior beliefs and prepare
them for Christian conversion, Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule
in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 46–67.
8Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 17, 24, 23.
9Ibid., 25.
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10 THE GERMANIC REVIEW  VOLUME 90, NUMBER 1 / 2015
and affective power.”10 More concretely, anthropologist Peter van der Veer invites us to ex-
amine how supposedly Western ideas of “rationality and progress were [ . . . ] produced and
universally spread in the expansion of European power” but “inserted in different historical
trajectories” in places such as India and China. Focusing on the state and elite groups, van
der Veer emphasizes continuities in Chinese state secularism from the Imperial to the Maoist
period and compares this to the secularism of similarly hegemonic groups in India.11
While I admire these studies, I take issue with the underlying narrative produced by
the assumption that national and imperial projects of secularization were consolidated by
1850 and extended globally thereafter under the auspices of liberalism and the modern state.
Despite insistence on local variation, this narrative places the history of secularism within a
linear process of continual adjustment without serious reversal. Much of the literature draws
its examples from the British Empire, and many of its authors work in North American
universities, two settings, where, arguably, liberalism has remained the dominant political
system since the nineteenth century.
In short, even if they investigate micro-political developments, the histories of secu-
larism tend to be universal histories. To the degree that they consider worldview secularism,
these histories incorporate it as a factor in the elaboration of a larger and essentially singular
project of emergent secularity. The same applies to a provocative work inspired by Taylor’s A
Secular Age, John Lardas Modern’s Secularism in Antebellum America, which places world-
view atheism alongside Protestant evangelicalism, spiritualism, and phrenology, as one of
the myriad religious experiments that emerged in a dialectical relationship to a rising secular
order.12
This essay argues, by contrast, that the history of worldview secularism problematizes
the assumptions made in the new universal histories of the secular. Employing the tools of
conceptual history, which holds that words themselves bear the traces of social, religious,
and intellectual struggles, I will examine the relation of worldview secularists and their
interlocutors as revealed through the history of the term “secularism” and its cognate concepts.
I begin by returning to the coining of the term “secularism” in 1851 and asking whether the
neologism added semantic grist to the liberals’ mill, as Asad suggested, or whether it was
not also throwing a wrench into the works. The essay then turns to Germany to explore
how competition between worldview secularism and political secularism was reflected in the
emergence of early sociological theories of secularization around 1900. It asks why the liberal
10Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, eds., Secularisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 7
(italic in the original).
11Peter van der Veer, The Modern Spirit of Asia: The Spiritual and the Secular in China and India
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 144–167.
12Lardas Modern reads this explosion of religious experiment as part of what Taylor termed the
“nova effect.” The book is centered on 1851, the year of the publication of Melville’s Moby Dick and
also, coincidentally, the year in which the “secularism” was coined. John Lardas Modern, Secular-
ism in Antebellum America with Reference to Ghosts, Protestant Subcultures, Machines, and Their
Metaphors: Featuring Discussions of Mass Media, Moby-Dick, Spirituality, Phrenology, Anthropology,
Sing Sing State Penitentiary, and Sex with the New Motive Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2011).
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 11
theory of secularization did not gain widespread acceptance and why the terms “secular,”
“secularism,” and “secularization” achieved their contemporary meanings in Germany only
after 1945. The answers to these questions provide a vantage point from which to critically
rethink the universal history of political secularism.
THE EMERGENCE OF SECULARISM IN BRITAIN IN THE 1840S AND 1850S
In a recent publication, the prominent sociologist of religion Bryan Turner argues that the
“ideas of a ‘secular’ society” grew out of Holyoake’s secularist movement.13 Yet a look at
the 1840s reveals that—at least on the level of terminology—the opposite appears to be true:
“secularism” emerged from “the secular.” The adjective “secular” had been widely used in
the early nineteenth century to differentiate parish from ecclesiastical and monastic clergy,
or profane from religious music. The binary “secular and religious” became politicized
in the 1840s in the context of a debate over national primary education. A government
plan to give the established Church of England privileged influence over a compulsory
school system elicited protests from Protestant dissenters in 1843, which, in turn, provided
an opening for advocates of secular education. In a July 1843 speech in the House of
Commons, one MP argued that Britain should follow the example of several American states
and Holland and make the schools secular and nondenominational, allowing, however, the
various churches to delegate ministers for religious instruction. Such national education
would help “in counteracting an insurrectionary spirit” and “putting an end to the Welsh
and Gaelic languages.”14 Striking a similar tone, a pamphlet of that year argued that secular
education would aid in the moral disciplining of the “lower orders.” These claims demonstrate
that, like earlier arguments in favor Catholic and Jewish emancipation, liberal calls for
nondenominational education emerged out of concern over national unity in a competitive
international and colonial context.15
The debates over school secularization were not devoid of worldview secularism.
Many assumed that secular education based in science was not only fairer than religious
education but also superior to it. Anticlericals, including George Combe, Britain’s most
famous phrenologist, began to promote their own worldviews in the name of nondenomi-
national, scientific education. The workers’ education movement, which formed a center of
Freethought, aligned itself with school reform, and a Secular Education League was founded
in London in 1847 in the Gould Square Mechanics’ Institute. The Owenite radical and chief
spokesman of British Freethought, George Holyoake, signaled his interest in the term by
13Bryan S. Turner, Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 128.
14
“Debates and Proceedings in Parliament,” Spectator, July 29, 1843, p. 2.
15Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1998); David Cesarani, “British Jews,” in The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews, and
Protestants: Minorities and the Nation State in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. Rainer Liedtke and
Stephan Wendehorst (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), 33–55; Wendy Brown,
Regulating Aversion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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12 THE GERMANIC REVIEW  VOLUME 90, NUMBER 1 / 2015
subtitling The Reasoner a “Secular and Eclectic journal’ in March 1849.16 A clear sign
of the impact freethinkers were having on the meaning of “secular” came in 1850, when a
leading liberal, Richard Cobden, addressed a congress convened to found a National Secular
School Association. He rejected this proposed name because, to his ear, “secular” meant
“not religious” rather than “non-sectarian.” If school reformers associated their cause with
irreligion, Cobden warned that they would be “opening up a chink in their armour which
they would some day have rivet up with more difficulty and discussion.”17 The delegates
were apparently convinced and chose the name National Public School Association instead.
Holyoake claimed the term for Freethought when he founded the Central Secular Soci-
ety in 1852. The year before he had defined “secularism” as “a development of freethinking,
including its positive as well as its negative side. Secularists consider freethinking as a double
protest—a protest against specific speculative error, and in favour of specific moral truth.”
According to Asad, the strategic benefit of “secularism” over the more exclusive and harsh
term “atheism” was to position the freethinkers to “direct an emerging mass politics of social
reform in a rapidly industrializing society.” A statement made by a leading Unitarian intellec-
tual of the day, Harriet Martineau, corroborates this interpretation. “[T]he term Secularism”
she wrote approvingly in 1853, had the advantage of “including a large number of persons
who are not atheists and uniting them for action” as well as getting rid of “a vast amount of
prejudice.”18
Thus we see that the neologism “secularism” did not produce the secular; rather,
it appeared within the field of meanings opened up by the politics of secular education.
Holyoake appropriated the term secular to bring Freethought closer to his desired allies in
the movement for secular schools, such as working-class Christian dissenters and middle-
class liberals. By shunting off primitive atheism and declining to enter a contest for absolute
truth in the religious realm, Holyoake positioned secularism to appear not as a denial of
Christianity but as a competing creed. As yet another dissenting sect, secularism could
petition for inclusion in the rights and privileges owed to all religious societies, including
the right to provided religious (or ethical) instruction in public schools. At the same time,
however, the semantic overlap with the secular claimed for secularism a privileged position
as the only “religious” creed compatible with the secular content of scientific education.
Holyoake was attacked by opponents on the right and the left for hiding his atheism
in “the secular.” One Protestant minister called him a rattlesnake that had discarded his rattle
16George Combe, What Should Secular Education Embrace (Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart, 1848);
Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels: The Origins of the British Secularist Movement, 1791–1866 (Manch-
ester: Manchester University Press, 1974), 142.
17S. E. Maltby, Manchester and the Movement for National Elementary Education 1800–1870 (Manch-
ester: Manchester University Press, 1918), 78–79. A writer in The Reasoner insisted that “secular” was
the only proper term that could encompass a national education, because it created parity not just among
the sects but also among those “of no sect.” Austin, “What’s in a Name?” The Reasoner, no. 8, vol. 10
(1850), 88–89.
18George Holyoake, “The Principles of Secularism,” The Reasoner, Jan. 8, 1854, reprinted in Edward
Royle, The Infidel Tradition from Paine to Bradlaugh (London: Macmillan, 1976), 151–152; Asad,
Formations of the Secular, 24; Martineau quoted in George Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession
of Belief (Chicago: Open Court, 1896).
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 13
but was no less venomous.19 However, this move had another cost: Holyoake’s semantic
distinctions were difficult to maintain. Late in the century, he protested that his term “secu-
larism” was being usurped and confused with secularity:
Things secular are as separate from the Church as land from the ocean. And what
nobody seems to discern is that things secular are in themselves quite different
from Secularism. The secular is a mode of instruction; Secularism is a code of
conduct. [ . . . ] Secularist teaching would [conflict with theology], but secular
instruction would not.20
Holyoake inserted “mode” and “code” to shore up the distinction between political
secularization and worldview secularism.21 Holyoake’s frustration at the failure of the pub-
lic to uphold this distinction is instructive. On the one hand, it supports Asad’s implicit
claim that worldview secularism had become subordinated to liberal dominance and political
secularization. On the other, it indicates that secularists continued to resist this subordina-
tion. In order to demonstrate how this secularist resistance could in turn shape—and even
deform—liberalism, I turn now to the German case.
LIBERALS AND SECULARISTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY
By treating worldview secularists and advocates of state secularization as two distinct groups
with different social and political characteristics—the former being more lower-class and
politically radical, the latter being more middle-class and liberal—I am running roughshod
over numerous gray areas. There were, of course, wealthy, reactionary advocates of a monis-
tic conception of the universe, just as there were radical socialists who defended Christianity.
I employ these two groups as ideal types that allow me to make an intervention into a crit-
ical literature that tends to focus only on one, namely liberals. These ideal types are also
useful for making comparisons between the British and German experiences of secularism
and secularization, which increasingly diverged after 1870. Until then, the relationship be-
tween worldview secularists and liberals had been relatively harmonious in both Britain and
Central Europe. Liberals justified state secularization by championing the rights of secular-
ists and other religious minorities, and, in both regions, leading liberals supported popular
19Charles Southwell, Review of a Controversy between the Rev. Brewin Grant and G. J. Holyoake (Lon-
don, 1853), 19. The atheist Freethinker Charles Bradlaugh criticized Holyoake’s term in an 1870 debate.
Holyoake and Bradlaugh, Secularism, Scepticism, and Atheism: Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of
a Two Nights’ Public Debate between Messrs. G. J. Holyoake & C. Bradlaugh: Held at the New Hall
of Science, London, on the Evenings of March 10 and 11, 1870 (London: Austin, 1870).
20Holyoake, English Secularism, 2.
21In another passage, Holyoake introduces “secularity” as the aim of the “mode” of secular education.
In the field of religion “irreconcilable diversity exists,” while “[i]n secularity there is no disunity.” Only
secularity, which took no stance on the validity of the competing moral codes, could form the basis of
liberal governance. Ibid., 67.
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14 THE GERMANIC REVIEW  VOLUME 90, NUMBER 1 / 2015
scientific education as means to inculcate liberal values in the lower-middle and working
classes.
But whereas British liberalism was able to bridge the social gap between these groups,
with the rise of socialism in the 1870s, German liberalism was not. This rift colored relations
between established German intellectuals and organized secularists. Major figures of German
science, such as Emil Du Bois-Reymond and Rudolf Virchow, sought to disentangle science
from secularist worldview. Virchow, who only four years earlier had announced his support
for a Kulturkampf , a “culture war” against Catholicism in the Prussian Diet, struck a defensive
tone in a famous speech of 1877, in which he urged fellow liberals to imagine “how the theory
of evolution appears in the head of a socialist.”22
Over the next half-century, the chief organizations of German secularism—Freethought
and Free Religion—became increasingly identified with socialism, often to the chagrin of
their middle-class leaderships. In October 1912, a prominent liberal politician was pleased to
report the absence of any party colleagues at the meeting of the International Federation of
Freethinkers in Munich, which “some time ago, would have been visited overwhelmingly by
those who belong to political liberalism.” Having been overcome in “the leading intellectual
stratum,” secularist ideas “today find their last echoes in the lower strata of the nation.”23
The conflict between radical secularists and liberal secularizers has not featured in
recent studies of religious conflict in nineteenth-century Germany. These have centered
on the Kulturkampf of the 1870s and have generally employed binary models to portray
the conflict as a manifestation of the confessional antagonism between Protestantism and
Catholicism24 or as a clash between liberalism with its conception of state secularity and
Roman Catholicism with its vision of a Christian order.25
22Rudolf Virchow, Die Freiheit der Wissenschaft im modernen Staat. Rede gehalten in der dritten
allgemeinen Sitzung der fu¨nfzigsten Versammlung deutscher Naturforscher und ¨Arzte zu Mu¨nchen am
22. September 1877 (Berlin: Wiegandt, Hempel & Parey, 1877), 7. Todd Weir, “The Riddles of Monism:
An Introductory Essay,” in Monism: Science, Philosophy, Religion and the History of a Worldview, ed.
Todd Weir (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1–44.
23Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, no. 548, Oct. 26, 1912.
24Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict. Culture, Ideology, Politics
1870–1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Olaf Blaschke, “Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein
Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26 (2000): 38–75; Helmut Walser
Smith and Christopher Clark, “The Fate of Nathan,” in Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany,
1800–1914, ed. Helmut Walser Smith (Oxford: Berg, 2001): 3–29; Gangolf Hu¨binger, “Confessional-
ism,” in Imperial Germany: A Historical Companion, ed. Roger Chickering (Westport, CT: Greenwood,
1996): 156–184; Lucian Ho¨lscher, “Konfessionspolitik in Deutschland zwischen Glaubensstreit und
Koexistenz,” in Baupla¨ne der sichtbaren Kirche: Sprachliche Konzepte religio¨ser Vergemeinschaftung
in Europa, ed. Lucian Ho¨lscher (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, 2007): 11–53.
25Michael Gross, The War against Catholicism: Liberalism and Anti-Catholic Imagination in
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Tim Verhoeven,
Transatlantic Anti-Catholicism: France and the United States in the Nineteenth Century (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Manuel Borutta, Antikatholizismus: Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter
der europa¨ischen Kulturka¨mpfe (Go¨ttingen: Vandehoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 15
Although the historians of the Kulturkampf are only beginning to receive postcolonial
studies, they operate from a similar model of religious–secular conflict. Both identify policies
of secularization as tools of Protestant liberals aiming at cultural hegemony, and both place
the emergence of the theory of secularization with the history of that struggle. Several
historians of Germany now argue that Weber’s theory of secularization should be interpreted
as a partisan contribution to the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf in which he, as a Protestant liberal,
was raised.26
Developments at the height of the Kulturkampf support the claim that anti-Catholic
struggle pushed liberals to formulate broader projects of societal declericalization. The 1874
New Year’s editorial of one of the most influential liberal papers, the Berlin Nationalzeitung,
predicted that the coming year would realize “[w]hat we have hoped for so long [ . . . ] We will
be able to live and die as citizens outside the shadows of the church.”27 Yet I would argue that
worldview secularism disrupts the binaries with which the new histories of the Kulturkampf
have been written. There had been relative harmony between radical secularists and their
liberal allies at the outset of the Kulturkampf in 1871, but this gave way to the discord
marked by Virchow’s speech of 1877. In 1878, when liberal anticlericalism had largely
fallen silent, Social Democratic anticlerical Johann Most created a furor when he launched
a campaign for church-exiting (Kirchenaustritt) among working-class Protestant Berliners.
It was at this point that leading liberal voices, such as historian Heinrich von Treitschke,
suddenly rediscovered the Christian essence of the German nation and fused antisecularism
with antisemitism and antisocialism to arrive at his influential vision of integral nationalism.
Such developments require us to revise the bi-confessional model of nineteenth-century
German religious politics and go beyond a tri-confessional one including Judaism to arrive
at a quadriconfessional model including secularism.28
How does the quadriconfessional understanding of religious conflict contribute to our
history of concepts? What if, instead of expressing liberal Protestant triumphalism, the first
formulations of the secularization theory by sociologists Max Weber and Ferdinand To¨nnies
also contained signs of a strategic retreat? Half a century ago, the political philosopher
Hermann Lu¨bbe proposed that as these liberal sociologists plucked the term “secularization”
out of the arsenal of political anticlericalism and transformed it into a social scientific
26According to Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser, secularization theory remains perhaps “the most
enduring legacy of the European culture wars” of the nineteenth century. “Introduction,” Culture Wars,
7. Similar arguments by Borutta, Antikatholizismus, 414–415; and Oded Heilbronner, “From Ghetto to
Ghetto: The Place of German Catholic Society in Recent Historiography,” Journal of Modern History
72, no. 2 (2000): 453–495.
27Quoted in anon., Adolf Sto¨cker und die Angriffe seiner Gegner im Lichte der Wahrheit. Von einem
Nichtpolitiker (Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1901), 14. A month later, Rudolf Virchow justified an anticler-
icalism out of the spirit of Protestantism, when he declared in the Prussian Diet that just “as Luther
saw in the church the actual Antichrist, so it is our view that we recognize the actual Antichrist in that
which is called church, at least in great segments thereof.” Quoted in Rudolf Lill, ed., Der Kulturkampf
(Paderborn: Scho¨ningh, 1997), 164.
28Weir, Secularism, 17–22, 173–218.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 L
ibr
ary
 at
 Q
ue
en
's U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
3:2
7 2
5 J
an
ua
ry 
20
16
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term to describe an impersonal, macrohistorical process, they had effectively “neutralized”
secularism.29
Lu¨bbe has been criticized for misrepresenting those few instances where the terms
“Sa¨kularisierung” or “Sa¨kularismus” were actually used in the German debate.30 However,
I think that his instinct is correct. The neutralization mechanism is revealed not in liberal
responses to these terms, but rather in their responses to the secularist project itself. A clear
example is offered by To¨nnies’s programmatic speech given at the founding meeting of the
German Society for Ethical Culture in 1892. At the meeting, the founders—liberal profes-
sors, urban aristocrats, and businessmen—were confronted by leading German secularists,
including the biologist and monist Ernst Haeckel, who had turned out to demand that a
secular ethics necessarily wage a struggle against the churches and support their world-
view. Opposing this view, To¨nnies argued that a science of ethics based on the comparative
analysis of the moral content of different religions offered a more effective strategy for
ending the religious conflicts of the era. This science of ethics created a perspective above
the religions that could synthesize them on a higher order, rather than calling on one to
submit to the other. Importantly, To¨nnies subjected the worldviews of Darwinian-inspired
natural scientific secularism and Marxism to the same critique as the churches by treating
them as objects of ethical analysis. The appeal of Ethical Culture to freethinking liberals is
clear. It offered a path to national (or for liberal cosmopolitans such as To¨nnies a transna-
tional) spiritual unity without abandoning their respective confessions. At the same time it
defanged radical secularism by relegating it to one (underreflected) religious source among
many.31
The science of ethics was able to secularize secularism, but at a cost to liberals. They had
to abandon the dream of a unified worldview grounded in natural science. Some two decades
later, philosopher Heinrich Rickert and sociologist Max Weber formalized this neutralization
of secularism, when they argued that worldviews constituted systems of thought based on
value and not on empirical truth.32
The essential point here is that early, canonical statements of the sociological theory of
secularization emerged not at the highpoint of the Kulturkampf , when many German liberals
understood themselves to be locked in a binary struggle between scientific modernity and
recidivist religious traditionalism, but rather at the point at which this binary began to break
down. Radical secularism, aligned politically to socialism, ruptured the loose harmony of
29Hermann Lu¨bbe, Sa¨kularisierung. Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs, 2nd ed. (Munich: Karl
Alber, 1975).
30Hermann Zabel, “Verweltlichung/Sa¨kularisierung: Zur Geschichte einer Interpretationskategorie”
(PhD, Mu¨nster, 1968), 18–19.
31Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu¨r ethische Kultur, vol. 1, no. 1, Nov. 20, 1892, 7. To¨nnies’s
famous work of 1887, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, offered a sociological theory of modernization.
For a discussion of the relationship of anti-Semitism and secularism to the rise of the discourse of
ethics, see Todd Weir, “The Specter of ‘Godless Jewry’: Secularism and the ‘Jewish Question’ in Late
Nineteenth Century Germany,” Central European History 46, no. 4 (2013): 815–849.
32Max Weber, “Die Grenznutzlehre und das ‘psychophysische Grundgesetz,”’ (1908) in Gesammelte
Aufsa¨tze zur Wissenschaftslehre, edited by Johannes Winckelmann (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1988), 384–399;
Heinrich Rickert, “Psychologie der Weltanschauungen und Philosophie der Werte,” Logos IX, 1920/21.
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 17
political and worldview secularism and contributed to the ongoing fracturing of the earlier
liberal consensus on religious progress. Thus while some liberals remained true to positivist
worldview and with monist Ernst Haeckel called out “impavidi progrediamur!” [we must
proceed without fear], others argued for a division of science and politics from ultimate
questions, while still others embraced anti-materialism and anti-Semitism.33
SECULARIZATION, SECULARISM, AND CHRISTIANITY IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMANY
Whereas To¨nnies criticized monist worldview out of his own secular commitment, Weber did
so out of an affinity with cultural Protestantism. One of his chief innovations, as set out in the
Protestant Ethic, was to locate the driving force of secularization not in worldview secularism
but rather in the history of religion itself. Weber’s disentanglement of secularization and
secularism was echoed in the work of theologian Ernst Troeltsch. Yet, despite these efforts,
the leading Christian thinkers in Germany, Protestant and Catholic alike, largely rejected the
term “secularization,” because, according to Lu¨bbe, it contained “too much polemic of its
freethinking origin.”34
The terms “Sa¨kularismus” and “Sa¨kularisierung” were popularized in Germany only
in the late Weimar republic, in part by Protestant ministers, who had returned from the 1928
Jerusalem conference of the International Missionary Council impressed with the keynote
speech delivered by the Quaker Rufus Jones on “Secular Civilization and the Christian
Task.” Rufus argued that a turning point had been reached by Western civilization and that
instead of being the hub from which Christianity was exported into the heathen world, the
West was now threatened by heathens in its European core. German theologians translated
Rufus’s terminology and defined “Sa¨kularismus” as the collectivity of “all forces opposing the
faith.” It was, according to missionary Siegfried Knak, the “worldview and attitude” behind
the “commerce, politics, industry and technology” of the day. Crucially, this definition of
secularism conflated radical Freethought and communism with the secularization of modern
civilization.35
The theory that secularization was a pathology caused by secularism was articulated
in the concept of “Kulturbolschewismus” then being advanced by Catholic and Protestant
theologians and politicians. Christian advocates of authoritarianism found “cultural Bolshe-
vism” congenial, because it connected the bogey of Soviet communism to socialism and
liberalism by pointing to a common secularist root. Karl Hutten, a Protestant minister, called
communism “not only a political movement—in our German Bolshevism that is perhaps not
even the essential matter—rather it is a spiritual orientation (Gesinnung).” This “worldview
of radical immanence (Diesseitigkeit) and godlessness” has its origin “above all in fallen
liberalism. There is almost a straight line between ruined liberalism and Bolshevik cultural
33Weir, “Riddles,” 9.
34Lu¨bbe, Sa¨kularisierung, 59.
35Kurt Nowak, “Zur protestantischen Sa¨kularismus-Debatte um 1930,” Wissenschaft und Praxis in
Kirche und Gesellschaft 69 (1980): 37–51; Siegfried Knak, Sa¨kularismus und Mission (Gu¨tersloh:
Bertelsmann, 1929), 2.
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revolution.”36 A similar argument was made in the May 1931 papal encyclical “Quadra-
gesimo anno,” which called on Catholics to “remember that Liberalism is the father of this
Socialism that is pervading morality and culture and that Bolshevism will be its heir.”37
Weber and Troeltsch’s distinction between secularization and secularism could not
catch hold in Germany prior to 1933, because, I would argue, liberals and conservatives
proved unable to neutralize worldview secularism politically. It was only after the war
that the prominent German theologian Friedrich Gogarten arrived at a new position that
distinguished between a healthy secularization compatible with modern Protestantism and a
secularism that resulted from the irrational apotheosis of the secular. Secularization, he wrote,
was “the necessary and legitimate consequence of Christian faith,” while secularism was a
“perversion (Entartung) of secularization.” Already in 1950, another Protestant theologian,
Friedrich Karl Schumann, had ascribed to secularism the status of a theological–philosophical
error, “a misunderstanding of the genuine Christian differentiation of ‘spiritual’ and ‘worldly’
produced within the Christian domain.”38
Numerous social, political, and religious transformations would have to be considered
to account for this revaluation and acceptance of secularization in the period after 1945. The
transformations began already in 1933 when the Nazi regime fundamentally reorganized con-
fessional politics by eliminating Freethought and communism and by ghettoizing Germany’s
Jews. One Protestant theologian had proclaimed the “end of secularism” already in 1935.39
Following the elimination of National Socialism, which many Christians had come to see
as another variation of secularism, politics became more consensual and centrist in postwar
West Germany. Many Protestant churchmen, among them Gogarten himself, were happy to
forget their own experimentation with vo¨lkisch theology and Christian worldview during
years prior to 1945.40 The destruction of the German state, the lessening of confessional
tensions through the founding of the Christian Democratic Union as an ecumenical party,
and the spirit of anticommunism all led to the elimination of the quadriconfessional field
in West Germany. In East Germany, secularism became an element of state educational and
religious policy.
CONCLUSIONS
The conceptual history of “secularism” and “secularization” indicates that worldview sec-
ularism should not be prematurely subsumed under the liberal political drive for state
36Karl Hutten, Kulturbolschewismus. Eine deutsche Schicksalsfrage (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1932), 1,
3, 4.
37Papal encyclicals online: www.papalencyclicals.net (accessed August 25, 2014).
38Friedrich Gogarten, Verha¨ngnis und Hoffnung der Neuzeit: Die Sa¨kularisierung als theologisches
Problem (Munich, Hamburg: Siebenstern, 1958 [1953]), 143–144. Friedrich Karl Schumann, Zur
¨Uberwindung des Sa¨kularismus in der Wissenschaft (Berlin-Spandau: Wichern, 1950), 20.
39Hans Schomerus, Das Ende des Sa¨kularismus (Hamburg: Hanseat. Verl. Anst., 1935).
40On Gogarten’s own contribution to the synthesis of vo¨lkisch racial thought and Protestant theology in
the 1920s and 1930s, see Wolfgang Tilgner, Volksnomostheologie und Scho¨pfungsglaube: Ein Beitrag
zur Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 167–179.
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WEIR  GERMANY AND THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF SECULARISM 19
secularization. Liberals did not merely assimilate the useful tools provided by worldview
secularists—they actively combated secularism. Richard Cobden in 1850, Rudolf Virchow in
1877, Ferdinand To¨nnies in 1892, and Max Weber after 1900 sought to neutralize secularism
at the same time that they sought to tame religion. Yet, at least in Germany, this neutralization
was not entirely successful. When the terms “secularism” and “secularization” finally entered
German public debates around 1930, they were used largely as synonyms. Only with the col-
lapse of the confessional system and the banning of secularism as an important and divisive
component of domestic politics did German church leaders finally accept secularization as a
legitimate process within Christian history.
Although I find strong divergences between the German and the British or American
experiences of secularization, I am not breaking a lance for the return of the Sonderweg inter-
pretation to German history. Rather, I see elements of the German experience, in particular
the clash between politically powerful, hegemonic religions and radical secularism allied to
the political Left, as typical for many regions across the globe. This conclusion suggests a
number of points in an agenda for research that might correct the framework with which
scholars are currently addressing the global history of secularism(s).
1. The histories of political secularism and worldview secularism should be brought
together, but in a fashion that acknowledges the gulf between their respective defini-
tions and agents.41 This means, on the one hand, identifying, as van der Veer has, the
ways in which radical secularists worked through forms of secularization developed
in the nineteenth century by liberals. At the same time, however, one should question
the assumption that state secularization was a singular, global process with local
variations. Here I would agree with Hugh McLeod, when he argues that “[r]ather
than seeing secularisation as an impersonal ‘process’ [ . . . ] it would be better to see
this as a ‘contest,’ in which adherents of rival world-views battled it out.”42
2. With an eye to the deep transnational conflicts over religion that occurred between
the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, one should rethink the continuities
suggested by much of the current research. Rather than seeing the evolution of secu-
larity as an essentially unbroken line connecting the high point of classical European
liberalism to the neoliberal present, the German example indicates a discontinuous
history. Such discontinuity can be investigated through comparative semantic histo-
ries of terms such as “secularism” or “worldview.”
3. The periodization provided by the studies of political secularism needs correction. I
would posit an “age of secularism” or “age of worldviews” in the century between
the 1840s and roughly 1949. I would further divide this into two periods in which
the “culture wars” took different forms. In the first period, lasting roughly until the
41Jacques Berlinerblau recently called for a greater dialogue between scholars of worldview secularism
and postcolonial theorists of political secularism. However, his attack on the latter for its “obscurantism”
and alleged political tendency reads like an anti-postmodernist throwback to the culture wars of the
1980s. As such, it is likely to forestall rather than increase critical dialogue. Jacques Berlinerblau, “The
Crisis in Secular Studies,” Chronicle of Higher Education, September 8, 2014.
42Hugh McLeod, Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000),
28.
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First World War, the culture war was dominated by liberals and the major target was
the Catholic Church. In the second period, beginning with the revolutions in Mexico,
Russia, and Central Europe, there were greater levels of real and symbolic violence,
and the target was all established churches and, in many cases, organized religion as
a whole. This second culture war was not driven principally by liberals in alliance
with the modern state (though this did occur in Mexico) but rather by a revolutionary
Left acting from within the state (USSR and Spain) or as anti-state actors (Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, India, China).
4. Several issues for further research open with the question: Did worldview secularism
cease to be a significant social force and, if so, when and where? For Western Europe,
there was a watershed in the period 1945–1949, when secularization and secularism
became understood as separate phenomena. To what extent did this understanding
develop out of the religious struggles of the first half of the twentieth century, when the
war of worldviews overlapped with civil wars, and to what extent was it an exogenous
development that originated in the Cold War or Pax Americana? In Eastern Europe,
and presumably other global regions under communist rule, efforts were made in the
1950s and 1960s to build a secularist–socialist culture. What should be made of the
fact that these efforts appear to have faltered slightly before but at roughly the same
time that church attendance dropped off in Western Europe, that is, in the late 1960s?
In other words, what role did Cold War detente play in the emergence of our very
recent secular age?
Queen’s University Belfast
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